Problems with Sequoia Advantage Printer System VVPR

by: Ann R

Mon Aug 06, 2007 at 11:47:38 AM EDT

As interested citizens and members of BluWaveNJ, a grassroots political organization, we have been concerned that any voting system be secure, accurate and reliable.  In short, we want every vote accurately counted in such a manner that the electorate will have total confidence in the result of all elections.  To this end, we have attended meetings of our County Freeholder Board, we have reviewed the purchase contract between Essex County and Sequoia and we have repeatedly requested an opportunity to view and test the proposed printer which is the subject of this hearing.

Despite these requests, no access to the printer was given until today July 24 2007 when the hearing is taking place.  Additionally the report of NJIT which "tested" the printer was not available until the end of last week.  We wish to express our great concern and dismay with this proceedure.  Instead of transparency and openness, we feel that there is only the illusion of fair process. that being said and with the understanding we object to the frame work of this hearing we would like to note the egregious shortcomings in this system which are obvious even with the limited opportunity afforded to observe the machine and prepare for this hearing.

1.  No real world testing has been done . Instead of having a large number of machines tested by average voters operated by regular poll workers, under conditions approximating an actual election, three probably brand new machines, were tested under laboratory conditions.  We have no way of calculating probable failure rates based on these tests.

3.  The entire value of the printed record is that it be "voter verified ". The fact that there is no opportunity for voter verification of a third ballot after two have been rejected is clearly fatal to any possibility of accepting this machine.  This wans a criteria set by the Attorney General and despite all of the time given to the manufacturer they have not yet met this minimal standard.  A voter verified ballot requires that the voter can see his actual final ballot.  In a substantial number of instances where the voter changes his ballot twice there is no way for the voter to be  certain his  third vote was recorded as intended.  We note that the manufacturer has promised a fix to the problem in 2 to 3 months but at this late date we are very concerned with the lack of compliance of the new system. Surely the voting experts at Sequoia understood the meaning of "voter verified" and it is astounding that they seemed to think the Examination Committee would accept the instant drop of the third paper record into the  box  without the voter being able to confirm  his ballot.  If the Committee proceeds with his system a follow up demonstration  in order to see that the third paper record is held in the viewing area long enough for the voter to check that the record reflects the voters choice.

4.  The fourth deficiency noted in the NJIT report as well as the eighth, indicate that the audit  envisioned by the regulations will not be possible with this system.  Both the lack of correlation between the electronic ballot image record and paper record, the lack of a digital signature for each electronic record not only fails to meet the prescribed standards but represents a substantive failure with regard to the ability to verify the vote.

5.  The failure to demonstrate seals and locking mechanisms at this late date is also another cause for concern. Without seals it makes the apparatus subject to manipulation and tampering and eliminates the safety and security necessary for public reliance on these devices. If he Committee proceeds with this system a follow up demonstration is n order to see the tamper proof seals and how they would actually work.

The proposed purchase of these machines should not go forward.  The voting machines have not and cannot be modified to conform to the> minimal requirements necessary to safeguard the electoral process and should be returned.  For far less expenditure of public monies, we can use a paper ballot with optical scan counters and avoid the possibilities of fraud and manipulation inherent in the proposed system.  We must do as was done in Florida, Maryland and other jurisdictions and put the security of the vote first.  We strongly urge that the proposed devices be rejected.

  Ann Rea and Richard Insley
Co-chairs, Electoral Reform Committee
BlueWave NJ