The New Continentalist, Part 2

by: Thurman Hart

Tue Feb 23, 2010 at 06:58:35 PM EST

Here's the continuation of Thurman's Monday post, The New Continentalist. Promoted by Rosi

From Alexander Hamilton, dated July 19, 1781:

It is the temper of societies as well as of individuals to be impatient of constraint, and to prefer partial to general interest. Many cases may occur where members of a confederacy have, or seem to have, an advantage in things contrary to the good of the whole, or a disadvantage in others conducive to that end. The selfishness of every part will dispose each to believe that the public burdens are unequally apportioned, and that itself is the victim. These and other circumstances will promote a disposition for abridging the authority of the federal government; and the ambition of men in office in each state will make them glad to encourage it. They think their own consequence connected with the power of the government of which they are a part; and will endeavor to increase the one as the means of increasing the other.

My interpretation is this: General human nature dictates that people prefer their self-interest over general public interest. Basic selfishness will lead those who are in danger of losing their preferable treatment that they are being treated unfairly. Simply ambition of politicians at all levels will encourage these groups, not because they are right, but because they are likely to vote for politicians that agree with them. By feeding the paranoid fantasies of these groups, both politicians, and the groups themselves, hope to gain some benefit.

If you ain't thinking "tea party" by now...man, I don't know where your head is. Click through and see how Hamilton started out his observation.

Thurman Hart :: The New Continentalist, Part 2

In a single state where the sovereign power is exercised by delegation, whether it be a limited monarchy or a republic, the danger most commonly is, that the sovereign will become too powerful for his constituents. In federal governments, where different states are represented in a general council, the danger is on the other side-that the members will be an overmatch for the common head; or, in other words, that it will not have sufficient influence and authority to secure the obedience of the several parts of the confederacy.

Hamilton's point is this - in a monarchy, there is a legitimate fear that the monarch will become a despot. In a republic, comprised of more or less equal parts, the problem is reversed - it is not the central government that holds the country hostage, but individual parts of the republic (we'll call them "parties" or "factions") will emerge to defeat the will of the larger country.

Sound familiar?

Remember that Hamilton's point in writing this was to prove the case for a stronger system of federal government so that public - or continental - interests could be guarded against the small-minded intentions of a few.

Anybody feeling Continental out there?